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IN THE SUPRffi\,fE COURT

of the

STATE OF UTAH

In the ~latter of the Estate of
AL:\IA LEON HIATT, Deceased.
CI•:CIL J. HIATT,
Petitioner and Respondc:ntJ

No.
9963

vs.

JEX L. HL\TT, Joint Administrator,
et al.,
Objectors and Appellants.

APPELL~TS

ST.A.TE~IENT

BRIEF

OF THE CASE

This is an appeal frmn an order in a probate proceeding making a family allowance to the widow of the
decedent where the widow had executed an antenuptial
agreement waiving and relinquishing both as wife and
widow all her rights In the property owned by the
decedent.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The trial judge a warded the widow the sum of
$250 per month as widow's allowance without recording
any testimony as to her needs or her own financial condition or prior living standard of the widow of the
deceased. The court held that the execution of the antenuptial agreement did not constitute a waiver of a family allowance even though the allowance did necessarily
require the use of funds and assets of the decedent
which he owned at the time of its execution.

RELIE~-.

SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The appellants seek an order vacating the judg·
ment whereby the allowance was made, and in the alter·
native, seek a new trial upon the grounds that, insofar
as the amount of the allowance is concerned, it is un·
supported by the evidence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 20, 1961, A. L. Hiatt, deceased, and
Cecil J. Hiatt, the respondent, executed an antenuptial
agreement (Ex. I, R. 73-74, attached to this brief, for
convenience as Appendix A). The parties recited that
they were contemplating marriage as husband and wife
under the laws of the state of Utah, and that each owned
"certain real and personal property, and it is their
desire to settle the property rights as husband and wife
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after such marriage . . . " The agreement recites that
''whereas the wife desires to waive and relinquish any
and all rights. either as wife or as widow, including
right of dower. in and to any and all property now owned
hv the husband ... "; that she "understood and agreed
that all of the property of any name or nature, real,
llt'J'sonal or mixed. wherever they may be found, belonging to the husband for the contemplated marriage, shall
be and remain forever his personal estate, and this shall
include all interest, rents and profits which may in time
accrue or result in any manner from increase in value,
or be collected for the use of the same in any way."
She specifically agreed to execute and acknowledge
any appropriate instruments to enable the husband or
his heirs devisees, personal representatives or assigns
to give free and marketable title to his real estate.
The parties concluded their agreement with the
promise that "It is understood and agreed that each
party to this agreement shall control their personal
estate as described herein, and do with the properties
thereof whatsoever they wish and will, by his or her
orders and directions, or by testament, the same as either
could or would do if no marriage relation existed between them."
The parties were married the next day and lived
as husband and wife for approximately one year. At
that time a divorce proceeding was commenced by the
respondent against the deceased in Utah Count; and
the parties negotiated for a property settlement in the

5
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divorce action whereby Mrs. Hiatt would accept $1,000
in lieu of alimony and she would receive a Maytag
washer and lawn mower acquired by the parties since
the marriage, in full settlement of her claim against
the decedent. The deceased acknowledged that he had
no interest in the real property owned by her even
though his name appeared as a joint tenant of record.
This piece of real property had been conveyed by the
respondent to herself and her husband as joint tenants
in order that she could obtain the benefits of his veteran's
exemption. In fact, he did not even claim any interest
in the property. Mrs. Hiatt acknowledged such fact
when she signed the stipulation (R. 78). He died prior
to the execution of the proposed stipulation.
Prior to his decease, A. L. Hiatt had conveyed all
of his property to a nephew. The joint administrators
of the estate filed a civil action against the grantee and
his wife, and the children as heirs of the deceased filed a
separate action praying that all of the property conveyed to the nephew, both in the nature of realty and
personalty, be recovered for the estate or the heirs
(R. 28, 36). The defendants in those actions appeared
and consented to convey the property into court. The
children of the deceased subsequently consented that
the property all be probated as the estate of the decedent.
On November 16, 1962, Jex L. Hiatt filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment urging that the court
determine and adjudicate (a) the heirs at law of the
deceased; (b) that Cecil J. Hiatt is entitled to no share
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in the assrts of the estate; (c) that the respondent's
duties as joint administrator be terminated and letters
to her be revoked as a result of the conflict in interest
hd ,,·t·en her a rul the estate, and for various other relief
whid1 is not material to this appeal. This petition was
opposed by respondent and set down for hearing on
t ht.• trial calendar ( R. 49) .
On .January 31, 1963, respondent filed a Petition

for Family Allowance. The petition came on for hearing on February 15, and the court proceeded to hear

the matter. even though the Petition for Declaratory
.Judgment involYing many of the same questions was
on the trial calendar, having been filed substantially
no days earlier. J ex L. Hiatt and the other children
of the deceased opposed the petition on the ground
that respondent had waived her right to any assets of
the deceased under the terms of the antenuptial agreement.
It is undisputed that the property owned by decedent at the time of the execution of the antenuptial
ngrcement is the same as that being probated by the
court.

1

1

. .-\t the time of the hearing on the widow's
petition, there was no suggestion that the antenuptial
a~rreement had been induced by fraud or was the result
of ovet-reaching, nor was there any suggestion that the
agreement was not fair or reasonable. In fact, the contracting parties each had children by prior marriages ;
each was advised of the other's property and each wanted

7
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their respective property to pass to their children upon
their death rather than to their respective spouses or the
children of their respective spouses. The only question
presented for the trial court's determination insofar
as the validity of the agreement was concerned was
whether it constituted a bar to a claim for family allowance by the widow. This question involved only the
construction of the agreement, the execution of which
was admitted.
\Vithout taking testimony and without any showing as to the needs of the widow, and without hearing
any evidence as to the reasonableness of the amount,
Judge Harding entered an order allowing the widow
$250 per month to be paid from the estate, the allowance
to relate back to the death of decedent, and determined
that the respondent "has not heretofore waived her
rights to a family allowance." (R. 69, 71).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE EXECUTION OF THE ANTENUPTIAL
AGREEl\1:ENT DID NOT BAR THE WIDOW
FROM CLAIMING A FAMILY ALLOWANCE
PAYABLE OUT OF THE ASSETS OF THE
ESTATE.
It is undisputed that the parties executed the antenuptial agreement in question the day before their
8
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mnrringe. The provisions of the agreement are not in
dispute awl a eopy of the instrument is attached to
this brief as 1\ppendix A for the convenience of the
rourt.
The trial judge apparently reasoned that since
!luTe was no explicit provision in the instrument referring. as such, to a waiver of family allowance, the right
ton t'amily allowance should not be denied. This ruling
is at ,·:u·iance with the applicable authorities.
Xo lTtah case has been found. The prevailing
view in the decisions in other jurisdictions is to the effect
that where the language of an antenuptial agreement
provides substantially that the widow waives her right
to all of the property of the deceased, both as wife and
widow, such language bars her from claiming any sums
which she would otherwise receive under a statute pro,·iding for a family or widow's allowance. The California
statute. for exan1ple, is virtually identical with Section
i.)-H-1 lT.C.A. 1953, under which respondent was given
nn allowance in the instant case. In at least two instances. California courts have ruled that where a widow
has waiYed her rights in her husband's property in an
antenuptial agreement, she was barred from claiming
any allowance under the statute.
In the caseIn re Schwartz~s Estate ( 1947) 79 Cal.
App. (2d) 308, 179 P. (2d) 868, the agreement recited
that a marriage was contemplated, and recited that the
parties desired to make provisions with respect to prop~ erty to the widow "in lieu of the rights, which after the

9
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consummation of said marriage, said party of the second
part might or could have, as wife, or widow, or otherwise in said real and personal properties which said
party of the first part has, or may hereafter own." The
intended wife agreed to accept certain property "in
place and instead of all rights, which, as widow of
party of the first part she might otherwise have, either
as a homestead community interest or otherwise or as
a distributive share of the estate, by operation of law."
The court held that the language "all rights, which,
as party of the first part she might otherwise have,
either as a widow or wife" was effective to constitute
a waiver under the statute. The court said:
"The language of the court in Estate of Yoell,
164 Cal. 540, 550, 129 P. 999, 1003, which in-

volved the question of whether a widow had
waived her right to a family allowance, is cogently applicable to the cause now before us:
'To esatblish such relinquishment of right, no
more apt words could be chosen than those deliberately employed in the agreement under
consideration. True, it does not in terms and by
name relinquish the right to a family allowance,
but it does more than this. The wife covenants
that she has renounced and waived all claims
which she has or rnay have as heir of the husband
or as his surviving te-'ife. It is only as heir and
surviving wife that she could make her demand
for a family allowance~ a demand which she hcu
solemnly renounced.~ (Emphasis added.) See
also Estate of McCoy, 51 Cal. App. 2d 483, 125
P.2d 71.
"Application of the 'clear and explicit l~n
guage' test to the wording of the agreement w1th
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whi('h we are here concerned convinces us that
nppellant thereby surrendered her right to a fan1ily allowance."
The agreement provided In re 1ll cCoys Estate
Cal. i\pp. (2d} 483, 1:!5 P. (2d}71, in part
thnt "ea('ll party hereby wai,·es any claim to inherit
any share or portion of the estate of the other by heir-.hip. decedent, succession or otherwise, unless by the
will of the decedent." The court quoted from The Estate
of Yoc/1 the same language quoted in Schwartz's Estate1
<.'om.·huling that the parties intended that the wife was
not to share in any benefits of the husband's property
upon his decease. The court said:
IJ!q:!) ;)}

"\Ye conclude, therefore, that taking the agreement as a whole and applying to it the elementary rules of construction, appellant in and by
said agreetnent waived her right to a family allowance and that the trial court did not error in
denying her petition therefor."
The widow I 11 re Sum merville1s Estate 1 64 S.D.
:::~~. :!titl X.\r-. 158-15D, accepted the terms of an antenuptial agreement "as and for complete settlement of
ally and all clai1ns 1 may have or assert against all
property left by you at the time of your death." The
court held:
..... the language used in the agreetnent is
clear and unambiguous. The petitioner said in
the contract that she accepted the [benefits of
the agreement] . . . in complete settlement of
'any and all' claims she might have or assert ...
'All' means everything to which it is applied."
11
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The trial court's judgment making the widow an allowance was reversed.
In Maher v. Knauss (Colo. 1962) 370 P.(2d)
1017, the widow had bargained in an antenuptial agreement to "waive any right to widow's allowance except
that she is made a beneficiary under a later will executed
by said second party . . . " The court said, affirming
the judgment of the trial court:
"This language appears clear enough. It is
not ambiguous and admits of no construction
other than to apply the words used.
"The term widow's allowance can only mean
the statutory widow's allowance, there being no
other such allowance provided by law. Plaintiff
in error argues that the term 'widow's allowance'
as used in the antenuptial agreement might refer
as well to a waiver of the right of the widow to
take one-half of the estate. We do not agree with
this contention . . . "
The court noted that the parties had additionally ex·
pressly waived the right to take one-half of the estate
of the other in the event of death.
In Montana rule is the same. In re Oppenheimer's
Estate (1925) 73 Mont. 560, 238 P. 599, the agree·
n1ent is quoted in full in the decision. The substance of
it is that the widow waived her right to the real property
of her intended husband in one paragraph and her right
to any of his personal property in a second paragraph.
The agreement in substance was that she would not
make any claim against any property he left as an

12
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rstatc but there was no explicit waiver of family allowarwc. The court held that the agreement constituted a
waiver of the statutory allowance for support provided
umlt'r the ~[ontana statute. The court stated that the
npplicahle rule of construction was to give effect to
the intention of the parties in the same manner of effecting intention in the interpretation of other agreements.
l.t said:

"In order that the intended wife's relinquishment of her interest in her husband's estate may
include the statutory allowance for support, it
is not necessary that such allowance shall be expressly named. 13 R.C.L. p. 1041, Sec. 61."
The court reasoned that the only 1nanner in which
the proposed allowance for support could be paid would
he out of the assets of the estate. Since the widow had
waived any right to the assets in the estate, it necessarily
' followed that she had waived the right to widow's allowance. See particularly the reasoning of the court as it
applied to the real property on page 601-602 of the
Pacific Reporter. The court concluded:
"Our conclusions in regard to the proper interpretation of paragraphs 6 and 7 of the agreement are fortified by a consideration of the wording of paragraph 9, wherein it is declared to be
the understanding and agreement of the parties
that the payments mentioned in paragraph 8 are
to be in full satisfaction of ( 1) appellant's claim
I»·
for dower in the real estate, ( 2) all interest in the
personal property to which she would be entitled as the widow of the deceased, and ( 3) in
full satisfaction of all claims thereinbefore stated.
13
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To give the last clause any significance at all, it
must mean something besides the dower rights
and the inheritable interest in the real and personal property of the deceased.
"Reading this antenuptial agreement as a
whole, taking into consideration the situation of
the parties, the subject-matter covered, and the
language used, we are forced to the conclusion
that it was the intent of the appellant and deceased in entering into it, that the payments to
be made to appellant should cover all interest,
claim, and demand which she might have or assert
at any time against him, his estate, or property,
including her claim for a widow's allowance
pending the administration of his estate."

Vincent v. Martin (1932) 91 Colo. 106, 11 P.(2d)
1089, applying and following the earlier case of Brimble
v. Sickler, 83 Colo. 494, 266 P. 497, holds that the language "In full satisfaction of any and all rights of
dower, statutory allowances and rights of inheritance
as surviving widow" include the right to a widow's allowance. In the later case the court said:
"The case of Brimble v. Sickler, 83 Colo. 494,
496, 266 P. 497, is directly in point and conclu·
sive of the question here presented. Therein a
contract containing a waiver of 'any and all
clain1 of every kind and nature in and to any
moneys, real and personal property, and other
assets of every kind that might be due to either
from the estate of the other as widow or husband
or heir or in any other manner,' was held to in·
elude a widow's allowance. Therein the court
stated:

14
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.. ·\Vas the widow entitled to the allowance?
It setms clear that she was not. By paragraph 4,
just quoted, she waived her right to anything
"that might be due" to her "from the estate of
her husband "as widow." The widow's allowance,
being a claim against the estate (Dry Goods
Co. v. Bank & Trust Co., 75 Colo. 451, 226
P.293~ \Vilson v. Wilson, 55 Colo. 70, 77, 132
P. 67; Remington v. Remington, 72 Colo. 132,
209 P.802) is "due from the estate," and without question is due to her "as widow"; indeed,
we believe it is the only thing that is so due.
Then she has waived it.
" 'It is claimed that a waiver of the widow's
allowance must be express. Deeble v. Alerton,
58 Colo. 166, 143 P. 1096, Ann., Cas. 1916C,
863; Wilson v. Wilson, supra. If that means that
the words "widow's allowance" must be used,
we do not agree with it. This court has not so
held. If it means that there must be some term
which clearly comprehends the scope of those
words, it is here, as we have shown above, and
admits of no doubt.' "
In Guhl t'. Guhl, 376 Ill. 100, 33 N.E. (2d) 185,
the facts are remarkably siinilar to the case at bar. Both
the intended wife and husband had previously been
married and had children by previous marriages. The
agreement pro,·ided in its recitals that the parties
~ intended that the property of each would "become the
property of and descend to the respective chil~ or children of the parties hereto as the same would in the event
~ said marriage was not solemnized." The trial court
~~ ordered a widow's allowance notwithstanding such Ian-

15
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guage. Its decree was reversed by the Supreme Court
of Illinois. The court said:
"In construing an ante-nuptial agreement the
rules governing construction and interpretation
of contracts generally are applicable. To arrive
at a proper conclusion of the terms of a contract,
it should be considered in its entirety to ascertain its general scope or purpose for out of that
will come the real intention of parties. Collins r.
Phillips, 259 Ill. 405, 102 N.E. 796, Ann. Cas.
1914C, 188; Seuss v. Schukat, supra. Words used
need not be cast into a particular form to constitute such a contract, they may be informal
ones; all that is required is a manifestation of
the intentions of the parties. Those intentions
will prevail if they can be given effect in law
or equity. Hudnall v. Ham, 183 Ill. 486, 56
N.E. 172,48 L.R.A. 557, 75 Am. St. Rep. 124.4
Resort will be had to the recitals of a contract
if necessary to determine the intention of the
parties and the operative provisions thereof.
Dunlop v. Lamb, 182 Ill. 319, 55 N.E. 3544."
(Emphasis supplied).
The court held that the recitals indicated that the
parties intended that their respective property would
pass to their children and not to each other. Since the
widow's allowance would necessarily have to be paid
out of the property of the deceased, her agreement bar·
red her claim to the statutory allowance .
In the instant case both parties to the intended
marriage had children by their previous marriages. Both
intended that their property would go to their respec·
tive children. Each was willing to forego his or her

16
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claim to the properly of the other at the time of the
t·xrt·ution of the agreement. The agreement recited
that the respondent "desires to waive and relinquish
any and all rights, either a.Y 'Wife or as 'Wido'W_, including
right of dower, in and to any and all property now
owned by the husband." She agreed "that all of the
property of any name or nature, real, personal or mixed,
whrrever they may be found, belonging to the husband
bdore their contemplated marriage, shall be and remain
forever his personal estate, and this shall include all
interests, rents and profits which may in time accrue
or result in any manner frorn increase in value, or be
~.·ollected for the use of the same in any way ... " Each
party waived his rights to the other's property "as ...
if no marriage relation existed between them."

It is subxnitted that the effect of the trial court's
judgment is to frustrate the intention of the agreement
of the parties. The widow has been permitted to assert
a claim which she agreed should would not assert. The
court ought not to lend its powers to achieve such an
inequitable result. The trial judge's order should be
reversed by this court with directions to disallow the
claim.

POINT II.
THE COURT'S FINDING THAT $250 A
~IOXTII IS A REASONABLE AMOUNT FOR
THE \VIDO\V'S ALLOWANCE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

17
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The order appealed from (R. 69) recites that the
court received evidence "on the matter" and recites that
petitioner "is in need of an allowance from the estate
for her support and maintenance; and that the sum of
$250 per month is a reasonable allowance . . . "
There is no evidence in the record to support this
finding of fact. There is nothing to show whether Mrs.
Hiatt has other income; whether she has any other
means of support; whether she needs $50 or $5,000
a month in addition to her other interests to support
herself. The testimony of Mrs. Hiatt at the hearing
was not recorded. At that time, the court indica ted from
the bench that it would award, if anything, only $50.00
per month, and that such award would not be retro·
active to the date of death. If the widow is entitled to
anything, it should be limited to that amount.
This court has repeatedly held that an unsupported
finding cannot stand and that a judgment based on
an unsupported finding of fact will be reversed. The
leading cases are: Hathaway v. United Tintic Mines Co.
(1913) 42 Ut. 520, 132 P. 388; Greenhalgh v. United
Pacific Mines Co. (1913) 42 Ut. 524, 132 P. 390.
It is submitted that the rule applies with special
force to this case.

CONCLUSION
The respondent solemnly agreed, prior to her mar·
riage, to waive all claims against the property of the
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dt'l'l'drnt. both a~ wife and widow. The agreement is

uruunbiguous. Hcs pondent as widow is claiming assets
ot' the decedent through the device of a petition for
widow's allowa11ce. The decree awarding such an allowance is erroneous and should be reversed.
E\'en if the rlecree is not reversed in full, to the
extent that it finrls that the sum of $250 is a reasonable
alim' am·e for the support of respondent, it is unsupported by the e\'idence. A new trial should be granted
to determine the fact of the reasonableness of the allownnce if the respondent is not bound by her agreement.
Hespectfully submitted this 20th day of September,
1~lti:J.

GEORGE M. McMILLAN
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR.
I 020 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants
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.APPEXDIX "A"
.\XTE~CPTI.~.\L

1.\GREEMENT

This ,\ ntenuptial 1\.green1ent made and entered
into at Provo. tr tah, this 20th day of July, 1961, by and
between A. L. IIiatt. otherwise known as Alma Leon
Hintt, of Pro,·o, lTtah County, State of Utah, hereinafter for eonvenience referred to as husband, and Cecil
X. James. otherwise known as Cecil Thelma Nelson
.r amt·s. of ProYo, Utah County, State of Utah, hereinafter convenience referred to as wife, witnesseth:
That whereas the parties hereto are contemplating
legal marriage under the laws of the State of Utah,

.\ nd whereas, each of the parties own certain real
and persona 1 property, and it is their desire to settle
the property rights of husband and wife after such
marriage.
And whereas, the husband desires to waive and relinquish any and all rights, either as husband or as
wi<lowcr. in and to any property now owned by the wife,
and

\Yhereas, the wife desires to waive and relinquish
a11y and all rights. either as wife or as widow, including
right of Dower. in and to any and all property now
owned hy the husband:
XO\Y THEREFORE, in consideration of said
proposed marriage and of the agreements of the hushnnd and wife hereinafter stated, it is understood and
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agreed that all of the properties of any name or nature,
real, personal or mixed, wherever they may be found,
belonging to the wife before this contemplated marriage, shall be, and remain forever, her personal estate,
and this shall include all interest, rents and profits which
may in time accrue or result in any manner from increase
in value, or be collected for the use of the same in any
way.
And it is further understood and agreed that all of
the properties of any name or nature, real, personal
or mixed, wherever they may be found, belonging to the
husband before this contemplated marriage, shall be,
and remain forever his personal estate, and this shall
include all interest, rents and profits which may in time
accrue or result in any manner from increase in value,
or be collected for the use of the same in any way.
And the wife further agrees to execute and acknowledge, upon the request of the husband, or of his
heirs, devisees, personal representatives or assigns, any
and all proper instruments of release or conveyance
to enable the husband, or his heirs, devisees, personal
representatives or assigns, to sell, convey, release, or
otherwise dispose of, any and all real estate now owned
by the husband, free and clear of any and all rights,
interests, or claims, including dower rights of the wife.
And it is understood and agreed that each party
to this agreement shall control their personal estate, as
described herein, and do with the properties thereof,
whatsoever they wish and will, by his or her orders or
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dircl'tions, or by testament, the same as either could or
would do if no marriage relation existed between them.
1:\ \\'I TX ESS \VI-IEREOF. the parties have
hereunto set their hands the day and date first above
written.
A.L.HIATT
Husband

CECIL N.
Wife

JA~IES

\Vitness:
I> E.\:\ E. TERRY

STATE OF UTAJI
COrXTY OF UT.A.H

ss.

On the 20th day of July, A.D. 1961, personally appeared before 1ne, A. L. Hiatt, otherwise known as Alma
Leon 1-1 ia tt. and Cecil N. James, otherwise known as
Cecil Thelma X elson James, the signers of the within
1 instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they
: executed the smne.
DEAN E. TERRY
Notary Public
Residing at Provo, Utah
.)ly Commission Expires January 8, 1963.
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